Introduction
There is little dispute that the global health agenda is increasingly being shaped by foundations and partnerships, as the introduction to and rationale for this book make plain. In the wake of structural adjustment in the Global South, and in the context of the worldwide dominance of neoliberalism, new actors are addressing global health crises such as HIV/AIDS, malnutrition, and water-borne diseases (Farmer, 2005; WHO, 2008) . This book examines the impact of these new global health actors on the wider system of global health governance. In this chapter, we argue that the mainstream global health agenda is being driven by powerful, wealthy, and generally market-oriented (and often corporatefunded) foundations as well as by new Global Health Partnerships (GHPs). Given the resources and political support these actors enjoy, they have become de facto agenda-setters and increasingly shape the trajectory of global health governance. Whilst such actors are investing resources on an unprecedented scale --especially in combating specific diseases such as HIV, tuberculosis and malaria --we argue here that they also have a tendency to bolster the same corporate, capitalist, neoliberal agenda that has been so deleterious to health outcomes across the globe (Harvey, 2003; Kim, 2000) .
Certainly they are not alone in this -much publicly-funded global and national health policy and spending is similarly underpinned by neoliberal ideology (Saith, 2006) . Nevertheless, there is a need to further explore the implications of this 'private turn' in global health governance as these new actors remake the health agenda in specific ways.
This chapter is divided into three sections through which we critically evaluate the ability of a relatively small number of foundations and partnerships (invariably based in the Global North) to shape the global health agenda. First, we argue that partnerships and foundations possess enormous power, in large part because of their vast financial resources. Spending at a level comparable to major state donors, they can fundamentally reshape how the 'work' of global health is done. Equally importantly, these organisations are a perfect ideational fit with the current global policy consensus on public-private partnership and the role of the market in delivering global public goods, a fact which hugely enhanced their prospects of being accepted as legitimate governance actors by the existing 'public' agencies of global health governance.(see Moran in this volume for a discussion of 'post-Washington consensus', neoliberalism, and this 'turn' in global political life).
Second, we look at the way in which both partnerships and foundations have pursued a particular kind of agenda, specifically one that privileges novel, 'fashionable' (and generally vertical) solutions that are 'marketed' and 'sold' in a business and policy environment. Their preferred approaches often take the form of technological solutions to disease, often with an emphasis on the invention and distribution of new (and marketable) products, including, but not only, pharmaceuticals.
Of course, the emphasis on these saleable commodities can exclude the poor from the resulting health benefits and further marginalise those without purchasing power. In taking such an approach, however, they exacerbate a problematic tendency in global health for symptoms as opposed to underlying causes to be addressed. Historically, vertically-oriented public health initiatives and vaccination campaigns have certainly served to drastically reduce the incidence of some diseases, for instance, polio and smallpox (Le Fanu, 1999) , and such successes have subsequently encouraged a belief in the efficacy and legitimacy of pursuing similar approaches to address other diseases. However, solutions focused on prevention, sanitation, and the provision of basic services are too often being lost as a result of today's preference for pharmaceutical research and development, and so called 'magic bullet' biomedical forms of intervention.
Third, the philosophies and ideologies behind this agenda cause us to question whether in reality it represents such a break from the past as is often assumed. The overemphasis on the market and technology elides a broad understanding of the social determinants of health, entitlements, and the fact that healthy populations exist in spaces of equitable resource distribution. Further, many partnerships, and indeed foundations too, have close organisational relationships with major pharmaceutical corporations focused on profit-based research and development, firmly placing them within the broader capitalist structure of accumulation which, by its very philosophy and understanding of itself, benefits the disadvantaged only indirectly. There is a potentially dangerous blurring of interests between GHPs, foundations, and the oligopoly of firms that dominate pharmaceutical research and development which has increasingly come to constitute a dominant elite group with significant agendasetting power.
There are further troubling associations between the approaches favoured by GHPs and foundations and the purveyors of the wider mainstream global development agenda, such as the World Bank and national Overseas Development Agencies. This agenda promotes economic growth and the expansion of capitalist enterprise as the key to addressing poverty, an approach that is closely allied with the failed mainstream development agenda that has been dominant in the post-World War II period (Fort et al, 2004) , but which has been demonstrated to actually entrench inequality and poverty (Ferguson, 2006; Li, 2007) . These arguments reflect broader shifts which have been taking place in global health governance. We are now at a juncture where the prescribed solutions for global health challenges are too often short-termed and stunted by the market-oriented nature and corporate associations of the partnerships and foundations which forward them. In contrast, an overwhelming body of evidence 4 demonstrates that reducing gross health disparities and solving the 'problem' of health entails reducing inequalities of all types, as found with income, material deprivation and social status (Adler & Newman, 2002; Bezruchka, 2006; Diez Roux, 2007; Kawachi, 1999; Labonté, 2007; Link, 2002 Link, , 2008 Link, , 2009 Marmot et al, 1984 , Marmot, 2004 Navarro, 1999; Smyth, 2007 , Wiist, 2006 Wilkinson, 1996; Wilkinson, 2005; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2007; Yip, 2007) . Whilst we are not arguing that there is some sort of 'global health conspiracy' at work, we do seek to problematise the orientation of the contemporary global health agenda and refocus attention on equity and population health. We see problems with both the dominant diagnosis of and prescription for global health problems. Explanations of health status that rest at the level of the individual, and interventions which have effectively ignored the role of public services and the state as well as the social and structural causes of disease, shape contemporary global health governance in a detrimental way. This chapter therefore emphasises the importance of public services in global life, with 'public' implying something available to all in a society. As partnerships and foundations are not state-based actors, and often only superficially engage with the state and public services, they can further limit understating of the importance and efficacy of publicly orientated entitlement initiatives.
It is important to emphasise at the outset that, of course, not all foundations and partnerships engage in the above practices or paradigms, and to homogenise them is unfair. The Soros Foundation's work, to take one example, is an outstanding illustration of progressive global health action. However, there is a need to analyse the broader systemic failings apparent in global health governance to ensure that contemporary policies and health interventions do not further propel market-driven interests which are inimical to better public health. If contemporary global health governance is indeed revitalising the mainstream development agenda that has been so soundly critiqued for its generation and perpetuation of global socioeconomic injustice (Ferguson, 2006; Lawson, 2007; Stiglitz, 2003) , then the global health community could, ironically, be the midwife to the re-entrenchment of a wider development project that it has itself often very vocally criticised. Coupling this approach to development with a focus on business principles and new technologies may further undermine the potential for global health to be a progressive force working on behalf of the marginalised.
Agenda-Setting Power
The power to define the global health agenda is the power to decide which problems are addressed and how --a power which ultimately shapes many people's experiences of health, illness or well-being. The ability to set agendas in global health, as in other issue areas, stems from a combination of material, procedural and ideational factors. In the case of partnerships and foundations their ability to influence the global agenda is a product of the resources which they are able to deploy coupled with the extent to which they have become integrated into the mainstream of global health governance and they degree to which they 'fit' with dominant theories and ideology about the efficiency of the private sector and the role of the market in delivering goods.
The most obvious source of GHPs' and foundations' agenda-setting power is money.
Foundation funds typically originate from individuals and corporations amassing wealth through the global marketplace, and in the case of GHPs their budgets are largely dependent on the donations of (principally G8) states, supplemented by resources drawn from the private sector. The scale of resources which many of the largest foundations and partnerships control automatically makes them major players in the global health field. As a consequence, the presence of both GHPs and Foundations The influence of partnerships and foundations on the global health agenda is not, however, purely a product of their resources which have 'bought' them inclusion within the system: it is also related to the extent to which they fit with contemporary ideas about appropriate models of governance and the relative merits of the public and private sectors. Both partnerships and foundations benefit from a widespread perception that their operational flexibility makes them in many ways superior governance actors. It is often noted that they can react to developments faster and make decisions more quickly than, for example, WHO, which is largely bound by the interests of its members and the bureaucratic nature of its structure. As a result of their supposed comparative advantages, many GHPs and foundations have become key brokers in global health, taking on the role of a sort of a hybrid 'middleman' between donors, corporations, individuals, civil society, and national health ministries. This ability to operate across communities --and their willingness to embrace novel approaches --only enhances their ability to shape global approaches. It is critical to ask not only why the Gates Foundation and other global health actors have the capacity to shape the global agenda, but also in what directions are they shaping it: what problems and approaches do they prioritise, and how does this affect people's lives. In the following section we discuss in more detail the technological and market-oriented approaches which tend to characterise both GHPs and foundations. It is important to recognise that this is only one possible model of global health governance, but it is one which meets with little resistance because of the dominant global dogma about the virtue of the market and its utility in public life (Saith, 2006) , at least amongst powerful G8 actors. Across public sectors globally there is widespread evidence of a discursive shift that encourages the giving of a role to private enterprise in delivering services (Adler & Newman, 2002; Coburn, 2004; Hogan et al, 2005; Mansfield, 2007; O'Laughlin, 2008; Opondo & Wendoh, 2008) . This discursive shift began in the Global North and has been exported as policy to the poor countries of the Global South, often as a condition of aid or debt relief. The field of global health --not least through the activities of GHPs and private philanthropic foundations --has fallen in line with this trend.
Technological Solutions for Social Problems: Addressing Symptoms, Not Systems
Partnerships and foundations are increasingly embedded in the global marketplace by virtue of their associations and funding streams. These actors are also ideationally and practically linked with a dominant ideology -neoliberalism; an ideology that underpins the centrality of the global economy, champions the expansion of the markets for poverty alleviation, fails to question the growth and dominance of capitalism and, ultimately, promotes wealth consolidation in the Global North (Harvey, often buried in the ostensibly altruistic and common sense nature of their chosen health programmes and methods of intervention. For us, these negative effects are best exemplified in the uncritical manner in which many such actors pursue the development and deployment of (saleable) pharmaceuticals and other biomedical treatments as the best and only solution to many health problems, and thus largely define the global health agenda in a particular techno-scientific and market-oriented way. Of course, when much of the thrust of the global health agenda becomes about the delivery of the newest and best technologies the subsequent demand for technological innovation is greatly expanded, as is the dependency of the governance model on what is essentially a global oligopoly of pharmaceutical firms.
The preferences and agendas of the new actors into global health governance have meant that global health has become an increasingly biomedical phenomenon. This shift has occurred despite cautions from the WHO (WHO, 2008) and prominent epidemiologists and public health practitioners about the very narrow nature of this approach (Kawachi, 1999; Link, 2008; Marmot, 2004; Krieger, 2008) , not least as it often neglects the structural and social determinants of health, and also marginalises approaches grounded in public health or 'social medicine' Yet, partnerships and foundations continue to promote an agenda emphasising biomedical solutions for problems that have roots deep in anthropogenic structures (Burja, 2006; Craddock, 2007; Pope et al, 2008) .
One effect of this narrow focus is to transform matters like poverty and health into technical issues, thus 'sanitising' and 'scientising' problems like hunger and ill-health (Crush, 1996; Escobar, 2001; Mitchell, 1996) . When diseases are treated as natural, pathological entities, it is possible to lose sight of that fact that much of the disease burden and many causes of morbidity faced today in the Global South are preventable. In fact, the root causes of many such diseases have already been addressed in the Global North, primarily through basic public health measures (Smith, 1999) . The tight alliances and sets of arrangements that have been formed between GHPs, foundations and pharmaceutical companies, however, both compounds and contributes to this trend towards 'scientising' global health. Obviously, pharmaceutical companies are, per se, only commercially interested in developing products for treating or preventing biological conditions and pathologies for which there is a market. Moreover, they are engaged in a wider (and very Western) system of biomedicine that atomises the causes of ill health and pathologises the individual, reducing interventions in health to the diagnosis of disease and its treatment via available technological solutions. While biomedicine clearly has its place in a spectrum of appropriate solutions to health problems, it is not the only one and is not always the most effective.
However, the belief in science and biomedicine has had a long history, stretching back to the global health programmes pursued by many of the first wave of American foundations (such as the Rockefeller Foundation),. This emphasis and particularly scientific and biomedical world view of health has found a willing and powerful ideologue in Bill Gates.
The Gates Foundation draws the majority of its funding from the personal wealth of Bill and Melinda Gates, money that was made via the technology sector, specifically from Microsoft. This has arguably translated into a confidence in technology and 'magic bullets' as solutions to health problems, a pathway which Bill Gates himself has very publicly championed. It is clear that the preferences of the individual in this case have informed the work of the Gates Foundation, and found natural allies in a global biomedical community and its counterpart firms. It is no surprise them that the Gates Foundation's disbursements have also augmented the natural bias toward biomedical solutions favoured by many GHPs, whose vertical disease specific programmes are often based on the deployment of specific vaccines, therapies or drugs.
Yet sophisticated technologies are not needed to control many of the major causes of morbidity and mortality in the Global South, including diarrhea, malaria, tuberculosis, or even HIV.
Incidence rates of the above diseases are comparatively much lower in Europe and North America-and clearly not because the Global North uses superior technology to treat such diseases (although the questions of availability and affordability of treatments plays a role in their prevention or alleviation of symptoms). Rather, the Global North has basic disease control mechanisms in place, such as public health infrastructure or monitoring and surveillance procedures, and has populations who receive a higher level of general education. However, by defining the wider agenda of global health as simply a problem that principally requires new technologies, drugs, or innovative measurement techniques, those in power lose sight of the basic principle that healthy populations, more often than not, exist in spaces of equitable resource distribution where health services and care are available to all, or wherein a wide spectrum of the constituent population can afford to pay for healthcare products and services (Bezruchka, 2001; Heymann et al, 2006; Wilkinson, 2005) . Whilst there is nothing inherently wrong with the focus on vaccinations, medications, or water sanitation devices, these types of biomedical solutions are often ineffective or simply unnecessary if basic public health infrastructure, such as sanitation, was widely available to a given population. At worst, techno fixes and biomedicine can be spurious distractions to the fact that such services are often inaccessible, due to their prohibitive cost to consumers and the simple presence of markets in their delivery. In the case of potable water and sanitation, the individual's ability to pay can govern their health status at the most fundamental level.
Partnerships and foundations thus often promote innovation or deployment of biomedicine above more pragmatic, longer-term and 'obvious' solutions to health problems. Of course, this also reflects the fact that the nature of the health problems that are 'out there' are themselves constructed by a particular world view of development and health. Taking the example of water is instructive, as according to some estimates 35 per cent of the disease burden in sub-Saharan Africa is related to unsafe or inadequate drinking water and sanitation (Smith, 1999) , the solutions for which has been known for almost a century (Snow, 1936) . Currently, many of the NGOs which are funded by and providing services on behalf of partnerships and foundations are under intense pressure to demonstrate results and the efficaciousness of their activities to their donors. One of the easiest ways to do so is to identify and operationalise 'appropriate' interventions, like medications, point-of-use treatment systems for water, and vaccinations. At the same time, an increasing amount of money in global health (including public money) is currently being directed towards pharmaceutical or vaccine research for water borne diseases, which naturally in some respects acts as a form of subsidy to the pharmaceutical industries and their stockholders. The circle of influence and reliance on the biomedical model, and its association with a globalised industrial sector, generates a self-fulfilling logic in this particular area of health.
However, straws in the wind indicate that the naturalness and effectiveness of this model of global health is coming under closer scrutiny by the very actors that have promoted it so assiduously.
The Wall Street Journal recently highlighted how the Gates Foundation has succumbed to external pressure to revise its polio eradication campaign. After donating $700 million to the cause, the Gates Foundation appears to be coming around to the idea that so-called 'vertical' approaches' are ineffective without measures to address the conditions in which those diseases flourish. The Gates Foundation is now totally re-evaluating its approach, and seems to have realised that it cannot independently solve this problem by supporting research alone (Guth, 2010). Since polio is transmitted through water contaminated by human faeces, access to clean water must be the first step in a more effective and sustainable eradication campaign. After all, 'fixes' such as vaccinations are often only temporary, onceoff, and cannot eliminate environmental risk factors.
Despite these promising signs, contrasting evidence from the Gates Foundation indicates a continued focus on technological and market-based solutions to health crises, as is apparent in their recently funded 'Safe Water Project, conducted by Program for Appropriate Technologies in Health (PATH) in India (PATH, 2010a). PATH's Safe Water Project aims to develop market channels for point-ofuse water treatment systems to be sold to those earning US$1-5/day. This project does not address why people do not have access to clean water in the first place, does not monitor health improvements from this intervention, nor addresses water adequacy-a key aspect of health (White et al, 1972) . Perhaps more importantly, PATH's goal is the creation of a market in India for household technologies to treat unclean water. The subtitle of PATH's Safe Water Project is, 'Partnerships for the commercialization of household water treatment' (PATH, 2010b). The two key words here are 'partnership' and 'commercialization', demonstrating how this Gates-funded project provides the 'partnership' link between the Foundation, the marketplace, and poor people.
Troubling Associations
The inevitability of this dependence on technological and market-based solutions is reinforced by the close ties that there are between GHPs, foundations, and pharmaceutical firms. In order to operate, all foundations and partnerships require money, and money today comes to an unprecedented extent from the contributions of wealthy (and, to be fair, typically well-intentioned) donors or from This close alliance between contemporary global capitalism and the partnership and foundation influence in health raises three interrelated concerns that are developed in this section. First, the current emphasis on technological interventions, when coupled with the broader privatisational trend in national health services, are together eclipsing approaches to health that emphasise social and structural solutions. Second, the role of partnerships and foundations as the agenda-setters in global health governance has enhanced the power of the pharmaceutical industry. This is deeply problematic because the pharmaceutical industry's goals are not synchronous or synonymous with the project of improving global health, even if the charitable gestures and worldviews that underpin their involvement in many partnership programmes are genuine. Lastly, partnerships and foundations are in many ways replicating the actions of failed development actors, and a development project that in itself has been partially causative of the global health crises. The development agenda has failed to achieve its own ends, and has entrenched certain inequalities and intensified poverty (Goldman, 2003) , thus making it a poor model for global health. Far from representing a radical break from the existing system, GHPs and foundations are too often reproducing its failings.
The social determinants of health
The latest iteration of the development agenda as it relates to health offers a prime example of how social and structural approaches that would better serve health are still ignored (see Kim et al, 2000; Farmer, 2005) Their absence is reflected in poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) and World Bank loan contingencies, and in debt repayment prescriptions that often mandate service privatisation, cut funding for core health and educational entitlements, relax environmental codes, challenge the ability of labour to organise, or demand lower taxes. Health and national health services have repeatedly been shown to be a casualty of such policies (Fort et al, 2004) . The resultant vacuum in service provision has in many cases been filled by NGOs, partnerships, and foundations, thus opening up new space for 'the private' in previously public spheres of global life. Yet researchers have identified that healthier populations exist where health is treated as a basic right of populations, and where health care is overseen and funded by states (Gloyd, 2004) . The prevalence of private actors as de facto service providers in many developing countries has had the effect of further fracturing already weakened national health systems, by selecting diseases or programmes to support, or by creating divisive 16 domestic wage markets for healthcare personnel. While their intentions for getting involved are laudatory, the effects can be disastrous, indirect and indeterminate.
More widely, while partnerships and foundations often ostensibly support the claim that all lives are of equal value, they very rarely examine or challenge why this is not the reality in global life (Kim et al, 2000) . Consequently, these actors are part of what anthropologist James Ferguson has characterised as 'the anti-politics machine'. As social actors they neglect to examine or problematise why particular populations are disenfranchised in particular places, and thus serve to normalise that situation. In turn, in playing an apparently technocratic and scientific role in the Global North's attempts to 'remedy' the ills faced by the Global South, they depoliticise the issue and help abrogate any deeper responsibility (Ferguson, 2006) . The existence of large-scale ill health and health inequality is in fact deeply political and constructed, especially when states have been systematically disempowered to care for their populations in the neoliberal era (Harvey, 2003 (Harvey, , 2007 and both major development bodies (discussed further below) and transnational corporations have been complicit in this process. Global health aid may even have a recolonising effect on the Global South (Hearn, 2007) , not least through the pathways it opens up for new hybrid forms of public and private health service provision.
The Pharmaceutical Industry: Duplicitous Intentions?
There are many understandings of partnerships and their roles in global health, including the well-developed typologies discussed by Bartsch in this volume. However, often neglected are the ways in which the partnership model has itself been partly constructed by pharmaceutical corporations, who after all have their own reasons for developing or participating in public-private partnerships.
The website for Merck, a transnational pharmaceutical company, provides valuable insight into how this particular corporation understands and frames partnerships: namely as a means toward market expansion. This definition appears to sharply conflict with what the 'public' element of publicprivate partnerships seeks to achieve: principally non-market health or development goals. Merck's website states that company leaders 'remain frustrated' by the slow diffusion of medicines and vaccines in developing countries. On the same page as this frustration is expressed, Merck's priorities are identified. The top priority is to achieve US $2 billion in sales to emerging markets in 2010 and be among the top five pharmaceutical companies in the company's target developing markets. Goal two is to ensure that partnerships are enhanced to strengthen Merck's market hold (Merck, 2010) . Performance is subsequently measured by the number of people on Merck's antiretrovirals (ARVs) globally, and by the strengthening relationships that will ultimately ensure diffused consumption of Merck's pharmaceuticals. Merck's emphasis on partnerships as a means to ensure its market hold are an example of how directly partnerships and foundations are connected to the global capitalist structure and how the agenda is being shaped by major corporations seeking market expansion. This example demonstrates that corporate social responsibility is sometimes openly viewed as enhancing corporate images without much (if any) sacrifice, whilst allowing for the preservation or development of markets.
We also see how corporate rationales for participation in partnerships are often thinly veiled business and investment strategies, wherein companies 'buy in' to the new lingua franca of global health without a real engagement in the more onerous or altruistic dimensions of that project.
ViiV provides a related example of questionable motivations for sponsoring global health initiatives. GlaxoSmithKline recently sold its antiretroviral (ARV) sector to ViiV, a corporation that uses partnership-style rhetoric to couch its basic profit motive. ViiV recently put out a request for proposals as part of its 'investment' of £50 million to support the prevention of mother to child transmission of HIV through the use of its pharmaceuticals (ViiV Healthcare, 2010) . ViiV has 'a single, sustainable, notfor-profit preferential price for each of our ARVs which [it makes] available to a wide range of customers in the Least Developed Countries and sub-Saharan Africa -a total of 64 countries ' (ViiV Healthcare, 2010) . However, 'availability' is predicated on meeting a very constricted set of terms. The unspecified price break will no doubt be a lifeline for some poor people, but the proposed scheme was extended only via the non-profit sector , not governments. Such a course perpetuates a reliance on NGOs; and the pricing scheme (aimed at NGOs) establishes a parallel structure to health ministries, leaving the former often better resourced than permanent government structures that are, arguably, better equipped to respond to long-term population health needs.
This has been a prominent theme in global health governance in recent years. Even at reduced cost, medications often remain out of reach of individuals and governments in many countries (Bwalya, 2006; Farmer, 2005; Koenig et al, 2004; McKellar, 2005) . Subsequently, other entities such as partnerships and foundations step in to fund the service, creating a situation like that in South Africa where more than half of South Africans on antiretroviral therapy have that therapy funded in part or totally by international donor loans or grants. The South African government has always relied on this funding, which is particularly problematic in the context of donor retreat during the global economic downturn (Cullinan, 2010; Nattrass, 2006) . This has an important upstream effect: big pharmaceutical companies have little incentive to negotiate with governments on pricing schemes and actually have increasingly more reason to collaborate with global health partnerships and foundations who have the means to purchase drugs at higher prices than governments. In some instances key foundations have negotiated to reduce prices and effectively circumvented the market mechanism where demand was ineffective in lowering prices sufficiently (see Youde in this volume), but it is significant that even in these cases the pharmaceutical companies have been responsive to private actors rather than states. '(Saith, 2006 '(Saith, : 1171 . Of course this raises the troubling question of whether a United Nations agency is becoming reliant on the private sector to generate funds, or even to raise awareness of particular issues. Does the move represent a shift in governance and the relative power of actors, wherein UNICEF cannot fulfill its independent mission without relying on the resources of private entities? Saith also argues that we cannot buy social progress; and that it is retrograde to place a price on the social world. Indeed, the size of a given actor's (private) resources has no correlation with its ability to address global health or development issues; and in reality merely ensures that such actors are more active than ever in shaping the global health and development agendas to reflect their own image or ideologies of health and development.
Replicating existing development failures
Our concern that global health may be replicating development failures is driven by the fact that it shares so many commonalities with the mainstream development agenda, particularly an emphasis on the market as a social organising principle and in the often limited role conferred on the state. We agree with those who argue that development interventions have in themselves often been devastating to health and well-being globally (Goldman, 2003) , even when such initiatives are well-intentioned, an argument that is rooted in a critical development scholarship that is a well-developed field of study across disciplines (see for example, Lawson, 2007; Sen, 1999; Stiglitz, 2003 ).
At its most basic level, development was conceived in the post-war period as a linear process of advancement, whereby the market and economic growth would benefit societies (Lawson, 2007) . The technological and business-oriented aspects of global health partnerships and foundations have been sold on a very similar promise: that by faith in markets and collaboration with private actors, and the 20 adoption of particular technologies and technocratic solutions, populations can improve their health.
Yet there is little evidence for the veracity of these claims and a mountain of evidence to prove the reverse (Barnett & Whiteside, 2002; Ferguson, 2006; Goldman, 2003; Sachs, 2005; Sen, 1999) . This, at the very least, should give pause as to the direction of the global health agenda; , and governance actors should more fully problematise their direct and indirect linkages with the failed development agenda.
Conclusion
Money is clearly required for global health programmes, and the simple fact is that money in health increasingly comes from sources other than state budgets. Foundations and partnerships have vast private wealth to disperse, which, when combined with the persistence of neoliberal ideology, allows them to powerfully influence the global health agenda. With the proliferation of NGOs on the ground that will absorb as much funding as possible-tweaking their agenda in the process to satisfy grantors (Hearn, 2006)-and the need for even multilateral organizations such as the WHO to leverage private funds, major donors are becoming a key force in sculpting global health governance. But too often global health governance has been seen in only altruistic terms and its connections with the mainstream neoliberal and development agendas have not been highlighted. This is a dangerous elision and we do not believe partnerships and foundations can effectively break with this trend.
Furthermore, scaling the responsibility for good health towards the individual, especially through biomedical interventions, disallows important conversations about where and how societies and states have a responsibility to the most vulnerable. Examples of wealth creation not leading to good health for the majority population are myriad (Goldman, 2005; Sachs, 2005) , especially for those ensnared by debt created by the development enterprise. The creation of wealth does not inherently dictate the just distribution of that wealth (Marmot, 2004) . There is little evidence that more wealth in the world translates into enhanced health care access or improved well-being for the poor (Bezruchka, 2001; Stiglitz, 2003) . The question of distribution is much more salient (Saith, 2006) , and the distribution of resources relies on social processes like networks, power, prestige, social stratification, and class.
To 'solve' global health problems requires an examination of processes that impoverish, disenfranchise, degrade, or otherwise harm people and places. Paul Farmer is the paragon of this type of work, but many others conduct it as well, including Craddock (2007), Jaggar (2003) , and St. Clair (2006) . Each challenges us to see the world as deeply connected and interwoven, highlighting that processes of wealth creation and well-being in the Global North tend to have an inverse in the Global South (Harvey, 2003) . There can be no substitute for focusing upon macro structures and the reasons people are unable to achieve positive health outcomes; a focus on technology exclusively, or-in the contemporary iteration of global health-a focus on vertical, disease-specific interventions, is among the worst ways to go about fundamentally changing the character of global health.
When considering solutions to global health crises, those concerned with global health need to take seriously the idea of 'health' in the broadest sense, expanding the conversation beyond a strict focus on disease, which often eclipses the need to think structurally. To do so requires an understanding of the more distal causes of disease and the obstacles to prevention and care. Without basic entitlements, people are forced to pay for services or technologies. Unfortunately, under this rubric there will always be those who are too poor to pay to keep themselves alive, further marginalising those in abject poverty. It is deeply problematic to hand the agenda over wholesale to entities so tightly linked to the global capitalist system, especially when there is little to no oversight to ensure the work they conduct is just, ethical, appropriate, equitable and efficacious, especially in the long term. This matter of rigorous monitoring and evaluation is well-covered elsewhere in this volume, but we wish to emphasise here as well the importance of close analysis of the ways partnerships and foundations operate. Researchers responding to this concern at the University of Washington, notably within the new Gates-funded Department of Global Health, are attempting to forward the idea of an NGO code of conduct that would standardise some operations and create baseline evaluation standards (Pfeiffer, 2003; Pfeiffer et al, 2008) .
The current state of global health governance is also a moral failing. Neoliberal globalisation, capitalism, and the continued insistence on uncritical liberal orthodoxies leaves billions outside the playing field entirely --they are not just ill-served by the system, they are wholly denied access to it.
Health is a public good and a human right. To continue ignoring this fact not only places the global health governance community in a place of hypocrisy and negligent science, but it is also failing to fulfill its inherent moral duty to the human community (Carmalt & Faubion, 2010) .
To continue to place confidence in partnerships and foundations fails to recognise the relational nature of health; that is, that ill health is created and we know of the interventions that can successfully address the major causes of morbidity and mortality. Partnerships and foundations are not likely to radically reorient the discussion in this direction. The challenge going into the future, given that GHPs and foundations are likely to remain prominent fixtures on the scene, is to see this light-a light that exposes why interventions are needed in the first place. The route forward does not need to be particularly sophisticated or creative, but it does require a commitment to place health within the widest possible context, one that exposes how anthropogenic forces of myriad kinds create and perpetuate ill health, increase the health gap, and cause suffering globally.
